EU, NATO, and Russia — partners or adversaries for the Nordic right-wing populists?
Aleksa Filipović — PhD Candidate — Saint-Petersburg State University
It was my great pleasure to present my research titled “The position of the main Nordic right-wing populist parties towards the EU, NATO and Russia” at the OPUS Graduate Seminar on 15th November. This is in fact an almost completed PhD thesis — a culmination of five-year research on European right-wing populism that started during my master studies back in 2016 and which continued throughout my PhD studies.
This research is focused on the foreign policies of four right-wing populist parties of the Nordic region, the Finns Party, the Sweden Democrats, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Danish People’s Party. The main reason why their foreign policy is the focus of this research derives from the fact that most of the literature in both Western and Russian academia predominantly focuses on domestic policies of such political parties, and on the international level, mostly on the status of the EU integration. This is no surprise however, as these parties themselves base their election campaigns on the socio-economic and political issues within their nation-states, with the main foreign policy focus being on the level of the relationship with the EU.
While the Sweden Democrats were strong proponents of “Swexit”, their rhetoric suddenly changed before the EU Parliament elections of 2019. This was also the case with the Finns Party, with the party’s leadership abandoning the rhetoric for “Fixit” in 2021. However, both parties previously demonstrated a highly pragmatic approach to politics, so it would not be a surprise if they again started to raise the question of withdrawal of their countries from the EU as part of their future election campaigns. The Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party have similar pragmatic attitudes towards the EU: the Progress Party, until recently a long-time member of the governmental coalition, recognized the benefits of the EU markets for the export of the Norwegian goods — but was at the same time critical of the potential Norwegian EU membership as it is concerned with what it perceives as the increased supranational bureaucracy of the Brussels. Finally, the Danish People’s Party is known to advocate for the more limited Danish-EU cooperation, but simultaneously recognizes the benefits of the European market for the economy of Denmark.
It is also important to understand the foreign policy directions of the above-mentioned parties towards countries such as Russia and military alliances such as NATO. The reason for that is simple — Scandinavia is a region of high economic and security interest for both NATO and Russia, and any change in the security policies of the Nordic countries can lead to increased tensions in the region and Europe as a whole. With Norway and Denmark being founding countries of NATO, Russia (and USSR before it) had not only a long time to get used to this, but also to shape its foreign policy around the fact that NATO has a presence there. However, if Sweden or Finland would suddenly join NATO, this would create a new security dilemma for Russia, as possibly NATO tanks, airplanes, and missiles could be stationed just 400 km away from Saint Petersburg, and with the potential to fully cut off both the air and sea routes Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. It is understandable that this kind of situation could lead to a diplomatic /political or military response from Russia. Given that the Finns Party and Sweden Democrats have the potential to enter governmental coalitions in the future, it is important to understand their position on the question of military alliances, as they can be in a situation to significantly influence their national foreign policies on such matters.
Besides military alliances, it is also noteworthy to understand the positions of these parties towards economic and political cooperation with Russia. In the age of a widening rift between the West and the East, now more than ever, it is important for policymakers on all sides to devote to sincere dialogue in order to ease tensions and find a way for mutual cohabitation.
So, let us take a look at the rhetoric of some of the above-mentioned parties in relation to Russia. For example, the Sweden Democrats claim on their website that, while Sweden must pursue policies that reduce the risk of Russian interference in the region, it still should strive to maintain “sufficiently good relations with Russia so as not to further increase tensions”.[1] However, written words in the political program are not a guarantee of the real sentiment of the leadership of the party, or the actions that they would take if in position to shape the policy of a nation. Just recently, the leader of the Sweden Democrats, Jimmie Åkesson was criticized in the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) by the Centre Party’s leader Annie Lööf, over the text on the Sweden Democrat’s webpage, which stated that the party strives for Sweden “to respect the balance between the great powers” — or in other words, a balance of power between the United States and Russia.[2] While this statement was removed from the website shortly after the harsh debate in the Riksdag, the question remains what the party’s leadership true stance on this question is. This is something that can most likely only be assessedin the future.
If we look at the neighboring Finland, we cannot help but notice the stir that was caused by the Finnish president Sauli Niinistö, who recently mentioned a possibility that Finland may apply for the NATO membership, should the need arise.[3] And while NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that both Finland and Sweden may join NATO quickly if these two countries decide to apply,[4] the representatives of the Finns Party were less enthusiastic about this possibility. This could be seen from statements of several prominent Finns Party members, such as chairperson of the Finns Party Parliamentary Group, Ville Tavio, who told the media that NATO membership would not increase Finland’s security at this moment, and that the country “is best able to safeguard its national interests as an independent and a non-aligned state”.[5]
And with the Norwegian Progress Party we can see that, while some prominent party members such as veteran politicians Carl I. Hagen, Christian Tybring-Gjedde, and Tor André Johnsen, may hold pro-Russian views on some issues, such as the 2014 Crimean crisis, they never strongly supported shaping of the Norwegian defense and foreign policies in favor of Russia during the 2013–2020 period when the Progress Party was a part of the governmental coalition.[6] The same ambiguity on the party’s position on Russia is visible if looking at the Progress Party’s political program, where Russia is mentioned only in the context of exercising full Norwegian sovereignty over the coastlines, fishing resources, and off-shore oil and gas deposits.[7] This naturally makes it hard to assess what the true policies of such a party towards Russia would be if it had to make hard choices.
Thus, whether the Scandinavian political parties are expressing Russophobic stances or are willing to pragmatically cooperate with Russia if they ever are a part of their governments, their positions must be analyzed and understood clearly. Naturally, anything that can lead to the decrease of tensions should be regarded positively. However, policymakers from all sides should be prepared to deal with the consequences in the case of tensions sharply rising between the countries with anti-Russian or pro-Russian policymakers and Russia itself, as again, it could have consequences not only for the region but for Europe as a whole.
In parallel to trying to answer these questions, this research also strives to present the characteristics of Nordic right-wing populism, as a distinct branch of European right-wing populism. The reason for this can be found in the fact that Scandinavia is a region with a particular set of rules and traditions, shaped by the historical context that involved empires, kingdoms, subjugated nations, and contested territories. Compared to the rest of Europe, social welfare and social democracy play a strong role in the national identity of the Nordic nations, which contributes to the specific political and economic orientation of populist-right parties towards the concept that can be described as “right-wing politics/left-wing economics”, but with the social policies often described as “welfare chauvinism”.
I sincerely hope that this research will serve as a foundation for similar endeavours in the future and that experts, political scientists, and policymakers will find it useful for understanding the current political trends in the Nordic region.
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[1] Sweden Democrats website. URL: https://sd.se/our-politics/ryssland/
[2] “SD Raderade Kritiserad Text Om Ryssland: ”Undfallande””. 2022. Aftonbladet.Se. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/34QOa0/sd-raderade-kritiserad-text-om-ryssland-undfallande.
[3] Ojanen, Hanna. 2022. “Between Russia, Sweden, And NATO: Finland’S Defence Of “Sovereignty Equality””. ECFR. https://ecfr.eu/article/between-russia-sweden-and-nato-finlands-defence-of-sovereignty-equality/.
[4] “NATO To Accept Sweden, Finland Very Quickly If They Decide To Join Alliance — Stoltenberg”. 2022. TASS. https://tass.com/defense/1387883.
[5] “Perussuomalaisten Puisto: Nato-Jäsenyyttä Pitää Tarkastella Hyvissä Ajoin — “On Liian Myöhäistä, Kun 5. Artiklaa Tulisi Jo Soveltaa””. 2022. Maaseudun Tulevaisuus. https://www.maaseuduntulevaisuus.fi/politiikka/artikkeli-1.1713153.
[6] Filipović A. — The impact of right-wing populist parties upon national policy with regards to the Russian Federation: the case of the Progress Party (Norway) and the Danish People’s Party // Международные отношения. — 2020. — № 3. — С. 18–53. DOI: 10.7256/2454–0641.2020.3.32336 URL: https://nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=32336
